За подслушванията, бомбардировките, Сталин и т.н. от създателя на PGP


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Хора нямам никакво време и затова пускам такова нещо, недопреведено и тн, но ми се вижда много много инстересно това нещо.

Това не е някаква конспирация, това са неща писани от създателя на ПГП криптирането още през 1996 в увода към криптирания телефон, който сега изглежда има алтернатива, но нямам време и за нея.

Преведох малко с Гугъла набързо.

Законопроекта от 1994 за цифровата телефония постанови, че телефонните компании
трябва да инсталират дистанционни портове за подслушване в техните централи,
създавайки инфраструктура, технология за "point and click" подслушване, така че
федерални агенти вече не трябва да излизат и да закачат крокодилчета за телефонните линии.
Сега те могат да си седят в тяхното седалище във Вашингтон и да слушат вашите
телефонни разговори.

Разбира се, законът все още изисква съдебна заповед за подслушване.
Но докато технологичните инфраструктури са склонни да се задържат за поколения, законитя и политиките
могат да се променят за една нощ.

Когато съобщителната инфраструктура оптимизирана за наблюдение се установи,
една промяна в политическите условия може да доведе до злоупотреба с тая новооткритата сила.

Политическите условия могат да се променят с избирането на ново правителство,
или може би по-рязко от бомбардировките на федерална сграда.

И надолу става още по-интересно, изисквали са да могат да подслушват по 1% от ВСИЧКИ
разговори, т.е. на практика всички и тн..

Това е само част, линк има отдолу.

The 1994 Digital Telephony bill mandated that phone companies install remote wiretapping ports
into their central office digital switches, creating a new technology infrastructure for “point-and click”
wiretapping, so that federal agents no longer have to go out and attach alligator clips to
phone lines. Now they'll be able to sit in their headquarters in Washington and listen in to your
phone calls. Of course, the law still requires a court order for a wiretap. But while technology
infrastructures tend to persist for generations, laws and policies can change overnight. Once a
communications infrastructure optimized for surveillance becomes entrenched, a shift in political
conditions may lead to abuse of this new-found power. Political conditions may shift with the
election of a new government, or perhaps more abruptly from the bombing of a Federal building.

A year after the 1994 Digital Telephony bill passed, the FBI disclosed plans to require the phone
companies to build into their infrastructure the capacity to simultaneously wiretap one percent of all
phone calls in all major US cities. This would represent more than a thousandfold increase over
previous levels in the number of phones that could be wiretapped. In previous years, there were
only about 1000 court-ordered wiretaps in the US per year, at the federal, state, and local levels
combined. It's hard to see how the government could even employ enough judges to sign enough
wiretap orders to wiretap 1% of all our phone calls, much less hire enough federal agents to sit and
listen to all that traffic in real time.

The only plausible way of processing that amount of traffic is a
massive Orwellian application of automated voice recognition technology to sift through it all,
searching for interesting keywords or searching for a particular speaker's voice. If the government
doesn't find the target in the first 1% sample, the wiretaps can be shifted over to a different 1%
until the target is found, or until everyone's phone line has been checked for subversive traffic.

The FBI says they need this capacity to plan for the future. This plan sparked such outrage that it
was defeated in Congress, at least this time around, in 1995. But the mere fact that the FBI even
asked for these broad powers is revealing of their agenda. And the defeat of this plan isn't so
reassuring when you consider that the 1994 Digital Telephony bill was also defeated the first time it
was introduced, in 1993.

Advances in technology will not permit the maintenance of the status quo, as far as privacy is
concerned. The status quo is unstable. If we do nothing, new technologies will give the
government new automatic surveillance capabilities that Stalin could never have dreamed of. The
only way to hold the line on privacy in the information age is strong cryptography. Cryptography
strong enough to keep out major governments.

You don't have to distrust the government to want to use cryptography. Your business can be
wiretapped by business rivals, organized crime, or foreign governments. The French government,
for example, is notorious for using its signals intelligence apparatus against US companies to help
French corporations get a competitive edge. Ironically, US government restrictions on
cryptography have weakened US corporate defenses against foreign intelligence and organized

The government knows what a pivotal role cryptography is destined to play in the power
relationship with its people. In April 1993, the Clinton administration unveiled a bold new
encryption policy initiative, which was under development at NSA since the start of the Bush
administration. The centerpiece of this initiative is a government-built encryption device, called the
“Clipper” chip, containing a new classified NSA encryption algorithm. The government has been
trying to encourage private industry to design it into all their secure communication products, like
secure phones, secure FAX, etc. AT&T has put Clipper into their secure voice products. The
catch: At the time of manufacture, each Clipper chip will be loaded with its own unique key, and
the government gets to keep a copy, placed in escrow. Not to worry, though-- the government
promises that they will use these keys to read your traffic only “when duly authorized by law”. Of
course, to make Clipper completely effective, the next logical step would be to outlaw other forms
of cryptography.

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